ClaudeSuperPower

supply-chain-hardening

Skill

Configure install-time cooldowns for npm/bun (minimum release age) and run a sandboxed pre-install scan when the cooldown has to be bypassed. Use when the user asks about supply-chain attacks, npm/bun security, "minimum release age", a "cooldown" for installs, hardening against Shai-Hulud-class worm

Install

git clone https://github.com/jamditis/claude-skills-journalism.git ~/.claude/skills/supply-chain-hardening

What is supply-chain-hardening?

Configure install-time cooldowns for npm/bun (minimum release age) and run a sandboxed pre-install scan when the cooldown has to be bypassed. Use when the user asks about supply-chain attacks, npm/bun security, "minimum release age", a "cooldown" for installs, hardening against Shai-Hulud-class worms, or how to safely install a package that was just published. Also use after any recent supply-chain incident in the npm ecosystem.

What this can do

Capabilities declared in this component's own frontmatter — not inferred.

Inherit all session tools

Declares no tool restrictions — inherits every session tool

~108 tokens of context used while enabled, before you invoke anything

Documentation

README · ~5 min read

Supply-chain hardening

Defends a journalism toolchain against the dominant npm/bun supply-chain attack pattern: a maintainer account or CI pipeline is compromised, a malicious version ships, and machines install it before anyone notices. Recent example: the Mini Shai-Hulud TanStack attack (2026-05-11) compromised 84 versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages and exfiltrated AWS / GCP / Vault / GitHub / SSH credentials via a postinstall script.

The defense is layered and intentionally simple:

  1. Install-time cooldown — only install package versions older than N days (default 7). This is the primary defense. By the time the cooldown expires, the security community has almost always flagged a compromised version and the registry has yanked it.
  2. Sandboxed pre-install scan — when the cooldown has to be bypassed (CVE patch, fresh dep, urgent install), run the candidate tarball through a static-analysis scan that looks for the diagnostic signatures of supply-chain malware. The scan runs inside bwrap/firejail/unshare so a malicious package can't escape the inspection.
  3. --ignore-scripts at install — postinstall is the #1 attack vector. Skip lifecycle scripts on every cooldown-bypass install.

These three together would have blocked the Mini Shai-Hulud TanStack attack on a stock laptop with no human in the loop.

Configure the cooldown

Verified config keys (npm v11+ and bun 1.3+):

| Manager | File | Key | Units | Exclusion key |

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